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to a unique personal God, and then to Christianity, is left altogether untouched.

The second half of the book treats of "Aristotle and Christian Theism," and will be of interest to believers in that religion.

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THE CONCEPT OF SIN. By F. R. Tennant, D. D., B.Sc. Cambridge University Press, 1912. Pp. ii, 282.

This book seems just an exercise in "Christian Ethics," and has little interest for the pure philosopher. There is a discussion (Ch. III) in which Dr. Tennant holds that the term 'ethical' should be restricted to voluntary action, and that any wider appreciation is 'aesthetic': there is certainly need here for a much fuller analysis, and recent work on value is quite ignored. The psychological part of the book (Ch. V chiefly) is traditional: indeed Dr. Tennant,—and many will agree with him,—seemingly regards certain philosophers, whom he quotes constantly, as being of equal authority with the Bible.

Chapter VI touches on the Freedom of the Will. Dr. Tennant discards determinism, and declares for a 'self-determination' which will save the future from being as fixed as the past. He holds that all determinists, perhaps, should be associationists. Here, again, there seems to be too meager an analysis, and an inadequate recognition of certain important positions in philosophy.

In one of his appendices (Note B), Dr. Tennant discusses the "Explanation of Sin," taking in principle what may be called a commonsense position. But the real problem of evil which must occur in any theism, is left well alone: a solitary sentence, it is true, tells us that God is responsible for the possibility of sin, man for its actuality, a remark plainly leaving untouched any difficulty in principle.

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EVOLUTION AND THE NEED OF ATONEMENT. By Stewart A. McDowall, M.A. Cambridge University Press, 1912. Pp. xvi, 155.

This book is written to ease the difficulty of aligning the central tenet of Christianity with the belief in evolution. First

Mr. McDowall establishes the existence of God: the environment "which calls out spiritual phenomena . . . must be of a nature that demands spirituality" (p. 16). Again, only a transcendent mind, which includes, and therefore is, the total environment of the whole world, can be the continuous cause of all phenomena (Ch. I). The fundamental cause in evolution is "a vital impulse," "an unconscious refusal to accept the present as the end" (Ch. II). This evolution proceeds by the inserting of some indetermination into matter; for in detail it is unforeseeable even by God, and so it is free (p. 40). We know we are free (p. 46). To be free is to be purposive (p. 48), as a *result* of the vital impulse. Sin is voluntary opposition to this impulse (p. 65); a self-alienation from the world-plan. (It is the free checking of freedom, we might say.) Now God alone cannot reunite man to himself, for that would make man unfree, and man cannot do it, as he is imperfect. Hence the Atonement. But I cannot see that Mr. McDowall connects it in principle with the difficulties he has raised.

In any case, even accepting the validity of his method of proving God to exist, we may complain that Mr. McDowall's account of evolution is incoherent. How can both God and the vital impulse be the cause of all? In what sense is what is free a result of anything? Why should God not interfere with a being who having sinned, is so far not free, *or* in what sense is he unable to do this? Again, how can we call the indeterminate a "plan," and argue from it as "result" to any particular agent? If we know what God is to do, he is determinate; if he is not, we cannot know what he will do. It is not a solution to call the Bible "that wonderful text-book of Evolution" (p. 136), although as such it is doubtless *very* wonderful. The great defect in such work as this, and in that of M. Bergson, is a lack of precise analysis of such notions as 'determination,' 'causality,' 'law,' and the like. But Mr. McDowall's book is an interesting example of the sort of pluralistic reasoning which is becoming so current, and it contains a good deal of purely theological matter on which I have not touched.

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